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Protecting User Privacy by Monitoring API Queries

Abstract:
This publication describes a method for protecting user privacy from targeted application
interface program (API) queries made to a prediction service on a computing device. More
specifically, the method involves utilizing an API Query Manager to monitor API calls made by
applications to the prediction service. If the API Query Manager determines a lack of positive
feedback (e.g., screen content presented on a display of the computing device does not match the
personalized prediction returned from an API call), then the API Query Manager can throttle
further API calls made by the application to protect user privacy.
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Background:
On-device, machine-learning powered features (ML features) are increasingly common
inside mobile applications and operating systems of computing devices (e.g., wireless
communication devices, computers, tablets). Examples of ML features include smart reply, text
selection, smart action suggestions, and the like. Such ML features utilize an on-device prediction
service, enabling them to work privately (i.e., without sending information to a server).
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The on-device prediction service is accessible to applications through an application
programming interface (API).

Applications may access the API to obtain and/or process

personalized predictions through the use of API calls. Figure 1 illustrates an API call from an
application on the computing device.

Figure 1
As illustrated in Figure 1, the computing device (e.g., the computer-readable media of the
computing device) includes a prediction service and an application. The application performs an
API call to the prediction service, and the prediction service provides a prediction (e.g., query
results, an API response) to the application. The application may customize a service provided to
the user utilizing the prediction. For example, a food service application may perform an API call
to the prediction service for commonly searched entrees, to which the prediction service can
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provide a prediction consisting of food query results. Thus, the application can suggest restaurants
that the user may enjoy.
The risk associated with applications performing API calls and the prediction service
providing predictions is an application may repeatedly query the prediction service in an attempt
to extract user information (e.g., a user profile). For example, the application may try to extract a
user’s preferred genre but may not need this information to customize services. It is desirable to
protect user information by monitoring API queries to maintain user privacy.

Description:
This publication describes a method for protecting user privacy from targeted application
interface program (API) queries made to a prediction service on a computing device. More
specifically, the method involves utilizing an API Query Manager to monitor API calls made by
applications to the prediction service, to the end that user privacy can be protected.
Figure 2 illustrates an example computing device and elements of the computing device
that support the method of protection described in this publication.
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Figure 2
As illustrated, the computing device is a smartphone. However, other computing devices
(e.g., wireless communication devices, tablets, watches, laptops) can also support the methods
described in this publication. The computing device includes a sensor (e.g., a camera), a display,
and at least one processor. The computing device also includes a computer-readable medium
(CRM) which stores executable instructions. The CRM may include the operating system of the
computing device, the API Query Manager, a gaze detector model (e.g., an algorithm that detects
the on-screen location of user gaze utilizing the sensor), and applications on the computing device.
The CRM further includes a prediction service. The prediction service hosts an API,
enabling applications to access predictions generated by the prediction service. For example, the
prediction service, based on inputs, may provide personalized predictions related to the user, such
as commonly used words. When an application appropriately uses an API for personalization
services, the results of the API call predictions typically result in changes to the information
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displayed on the screen of the computing device. For example, the application, in response to the
predictions, may present commonly used words as a smart reply suggestion.
The CRM also includes executable instructions of an API Usage Analyzer. The API Usage
Analyzer continuously generates real-time information relating to application activity, information
displayed on the display, and information relating to actions performed by applications. The
analyzed information could include information within on-screen entities, application context
information, and information displayed on the display of the computing device.
The API Usage Analyzer and API Query Manager work cooperatively to prevent
applications from obtaining unnecessary information via targeted API calls to the prediction
service. In more detail, between each API call made by an application, the information regarding
the interaction of the application and the user (e.g., screen contents, user input into the application,
system-level events (e.g., notifications)) is collected by the API Usage Analyzer and analyzed by
the API Query Manager. Additionally, the API Usage Analyzer can log sensory information (e.g.,
gaze detection) and the API Query Manager can analyze this sensory information (e.g., the API
Query Manager can use gaze detection to determine the presence or absence of user interaction
with an application making the API call).
Utilizing this information, the API Query Manager determines if the application properly
uses the prediction(s) provided in the API response. Proper usage includes the application utilizing
the prediction(s) for customization (e.g., to provide legitimate customized services or features to
the user). Indications of customization include the display of some or all of the results from the
API call on the screen of the computing device, indications that the user triggered the application
to make the API call, and an external event/state change occurring (e.g., an incoming notification).
If the API Query Manager determines there is a lack of customization, then the ability of the

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2019

6

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 2451 [2019]

application to make API calls may be throttled, or the computing device may prompt the user for
input (e.g., confirmation that the user desires the sharing of the information with the application).
An illustration of the API Query Manager determining an application’s lack of
customization, despite the predictions provided by the prediction service, is illustrated in Figure 3
below.

Figure 3
As illustrated in Figure 3, an application installed on the computing device from Figure 2
performs API calls and acquires predictions. The personalized predictions are not utilized to
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customize the application, however. Lack of customization on the application’s behalf, despite
the prediction service providing personalized predictions, may manifest in many forms. For
example, the application may perform an API call requesting commonly used words. In response,
the prediction service can return a prediction consisting of commonly used words. The application
may not display these words as suggestions; instead, the application may display generic words
(e.g., “The,” “A,” “An”). The API usage analyzer can log the on-screen information associated
with application activity along with the returned prediction from the prediction service and provide
all this information to the API Query Manager. The API Query Manager can identify an
application’s lack of customization despite the predictions returned. As illustrated, the API Query
Manager can then throttle the number or frequency of API calls permitted by the application and,
thus, protect the user’s privacy.
Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the user
to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs, or features described herein may
enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s social network, social
actions, social activities, profession, a user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if
content or communications are sent from a server to the user. In addition, certain data may be
treated in one or more ways before it is stored or used so that personally identifiable information
is removed. For example, a user’s identity may be treated so that no personally identifiable
information can be determined for the user, or a user’s geographic location may be generalized
where location information is obtained (such as to a city, ZIP code, or state level), so that a
particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus, the user may have control over what
information is collected about the user, how that information is used, and what information is
provided to the user.
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In conclusion, the utilization of an API Query Manager working cooperatively with an API
usage analyzer to monitor applications making API calls can protect user privacy.
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